October 27, 2009
La plus ça change
When debating politics, it often feels like arguments go round in circles. The same points seem to get made over and again by all sides. The specific issues at hand may change, but the underlying positions informing responses can seem not to.
And I’m not just talking about tiresome, stuck-record individuals. If we go back over 250 years – to the early-mid 18th Century, during the great debates about the emergence of commerce, the benefits (or vices) of luxury, and the great enquiries into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations – we find patterns of argument that should look astonishingly familiar to contemporary readers.
Take the following by Jean-Francois Melon, from his enormously influential A Political Essay Upon Commerce (which according to Istvan Hont, dominated the debate on the emergence of nascent capitalism for 15 years after it was published in 1734):
“The excessive Price paid for some trifling Provisions, which the Luxurious Man displayeth with Profusion, at an Entertainment, the Merit whereof, he would have to consist in the Expensiveness of it, is an Instance of the highest, and most ridiculous Kind of Luxury, and yet, why should this extravagant Expence be exclaimed against? The Money thus earned, would, if it lay in the Chest of the Luxurious Man, remain Dead to the Society. The Gardiner receiveth it, and hath deserved it, as a Recompence for his Labour, which is thereby excited again. His Children, almost naked, are thereby clothed; they eat Bread in Plenty, enjoy better Health, and labour with a cheerful Expectation. The same Money given to Beggars, would only serve to feed their Idleness and Debaucheries.”
The attitude expressed is not at all dissimilar to the modern defence (usually from the political right) that the rich can spend their money on whatever the hell they like, even if that consumption is stupid and superfluous. It’s their money, after all. Furthermore, the added justification which follows – that money spent leads to employment, production, growth and ultimately better living for those lower down the social order – is not a million miles away from the “trickle-down effect” argument beloved of neo-liberal politicians (and some economists) in the 1980s especially. The final remark – that there’s no point giving money to the poor, they must work for their subsistence – should hardly be unfamiliar to modern readers.
But Melon’s remarks are nothing compared to this tirade from everybody’s favourite civic republican multiple-child-abandoner, Jean-Jacques Rousseau:
“As soon as the use of gold was known to men, they all strove to pile up a great quantity of it. Naturally, success had to correspond to the various degrees of industriousness and avidity of the competitors – in other words, they had to be deeply unequal. This first inequality, combined with avarice and with the talents which had produced it, must have increased even more through its own strength; for one of the vices of existing societies is that the difficulty to acquire anything always increases according to needs, and that the surplus the wealthy have is itself what enables them to deprive the poor of the bare necessities. It is an axiom in business as well as in physics that one makes nothing with nothing. Money is the true seed of money, and the first crown is infinitely harder to earn than the second million. Besides, thefts are punished only when necessity makes them forgivable; they cost honour and life to the poor man, and bring glory and fortune to the wealthy man. A destitute man who takes a crown from a harsh man sated with gold in order to have bread is a thief led to the gallows, whereas honoured citizens peacefully quench their thirst with the blood of the craftsman and the farmer. And the monopolies of the trader and the embezzlements of the taxgatherer bear the names of useful talents and ensure those exercising them that they have the favour of the Prince and the esteem of the public. That is how the wealth of the whole nation makes the opulence of a few individuals at the expense of the public, and how the treasures of millionaires increase the destitution of the citizenry. For in that forced, monstrous inequality, it follows that the sensuousness of the wealthy devours in delights the substance of the people, and blows their way only a dry, stale, brown bread at the cost of sweat and servitude.”
- Luxury, Commerce and the Arts, 1754
Rousseau packs so much into this passage it’s hard to know where to start. But I spot:
- Complaints that money begets money, and inequality harms the already worst-off the most, which is very similar to a now standard “left wing” complaint against the lack of equality of opportunity in present-day British capitalist society;
- Multiple claims that it is the very wealth of the rich which makes the poor, poor. And not just because poverty is a relative concept – elsewhere in the essay Rousseau notes that “the words poor and rich are relative, there are poor people only because there are rich people, and in more than one sense” – but because the rich “deprive the poor of the bare necessities”. Again, this should not be a new or novel concept to the modern reader;
- Reflections upon the frequency with which (what we would call) “white collar crime” is severely punished, versus the leniency offered to that of the “blue collar” variety, something I’ve reflected upon before;
- Praise being heaped upon the professions of the well-off, whilst the important tasks undertaken by the poor are marginalised and under-valued despite their being essential. Members of the financial services industry calling themselves “the wealth creators” and justifying grotesque salaries and bonuses whilst nurses and bin-men go on unsung and largely unnoticed, anyone?
- That inequality is “monstrous”. Indeed it appears for Rousseau to be the inevitable and despicable outcome of free commerce and wealth-accumulation (which we would probably now call “capitalism”) and leads to the misery and suffering of the poor, who end up with only “stale, brown bread” as the rich devour with delight their substance. However, given what Rousseau says about inequality in On The Social Contract we can also extrapolate another thought (not expressed directly in this early essay, but definitely in the later 1763 work): that inequality is bad because it leads to mistrust, factionalism and the break-down of the civic community. In sum, if there is inequality everyone suffers, not just the poor. Wilkinson and Pickett use empirical data about health, happiness and life-expectancy in The Spirit Level to argue that inequality is bad for everyone in modern society. Rousseau favoured appeals to the political and civic nature of the good human life. Different arguments, to be sure. But inequality is derided in both for its unhealthy effects upon human beings.
The only apparent divergence between Rousseau’s polemic and standard modern “left wing” complaints against (what we now call) capitalism is his denigration of tax collectors. Most modern leftists see tax and its collection as a positive force. But then, we must recall that Rousseau almost certainly has mid-18th Century France in his sights here, where huge chunks of the nobility (and clergy) simply didn’t pay any tax due to their estate privileges. So Rousseau’s hostility on that front shouldn’t bother us too much or be at all surprising.
Personally, I find the above passages pretty striking. It looks as though – in some respects and broadly speaking – we’re having pretty similar fights, and making roughly the same points, as were being fought and made when nascent capitalism first garnered popular and intellectual attention in the early 18th Century.
Whether you find that simply interesting, or perhaps a little depressing, is an indication of your outlook on life and politics, I suppose.
Grace said,
October 27, 2009 at 11:09 am
definitely so depressing.
Paul Sagar said,
October 27, 2009 at 11:58 am
Perhaps only if you operate under the assumption that history and politics is about some sort of “progress”; that we can get beyond certain issues/arguments and “advance”.
If it’s just endemic to the human political condition that some conflicts are recurring and inevitable and irreducible, then it’s no surprise that we see them again and again. Accordingly, we should perhaps not worry about it or get depressed about it, but reflect that this maybe is what politics is for us.
Viewed in that way, I think the whole thing becomes a lot less depressing. Provided one is able to let go of the idea that politics must be (or even can be) about “progress” and not be bothered about “the other side” not being beaten out of existence.
Possibly ironic, however, that thoughts about “progress” were at the forefront of the enlightenment, and yet it may be the facilitators and heirs of the enlightenment that have, through what it achieved, the most to gain from realising that “progress” is possibly a chimera.
Grace said,
October 27, 2009 at 1:38 pm
what do you think the purpose of politics is then?
apologies for quoting the bible, but this really reminds me of ecclesiastes:
1:9-11,14
That which has been is what will be,
That which is done is what will be done,
And there is nothing new under the sun.
Is there anything of which it may be said,
“See, this is new”?
It has already been in ancient times before us.
There is no remembrance of former things,
Nor will there be any remembrance of things that are to come
By those who will come after.
I have seen all the works that are done under the sun; and indeed, all is vanity and grasping for the wind.
Mads said,
October 27, 2009 at 2:40 pm
Paul, I agree with your observations, I just want to supplement them.
This –
“If it’s just endemic to the human political condition that some conflicts are recurring and inevitable and irreducible, then it’s no surprise that we see them again and again. Accordingly, we should perhaps not worry about it or get depressed about it, but reflect that this maybe is what politics is for us”
- read in the light of the topic of your post looks suspiciously like a marxist argument (Although you might be thinking with Strauss?).
A way (bit reductive, but not entirely wrong) of reading the arguments of Melon (Dudley, Mandeville etc.) against the arguments of Rousseau is precisely as exponents of “class interests”, in the sense: to what extend and how do the respective thinkers take into account the interest of “them that bear the Brunt of every Thing, the meanest Indigent Part of the Nation, the working slaving People” (to use Mandeville’s expression)?
Is it assumed that a society naturally is unequal and consequently that such people necessary must be (relatively) poor in order for them to enrich the nation(!), as does Mandeville:
“It would be easier, where property is well secured, to live without money than without poor; for who would do the work? (…) it is the Interest of all rich Nations, that the greatest part of the Poor should almost never be idle, and yet continually spend what they get [which they have to because their wages follows the "price of Provisions"] (…) Those that get their Living by their daily Labour (…) have nothing to stir them up to be servicable but their wants which it is prudence to relieve, but folly to cure.” From Fable of the Bees vol. 1 (tellingly quoted by Marx in Capital vol. 1).
I have to go to Latin classes, so I don’t have time to comment further on this right now.
A comment on Rousseau and tax:
It is not just that the nobility in absolutist France did not pay taxes. French nobility would actually buy public offices as a means of a significant income, e.g. tax-office but not solely.
Public offices would be paid using taxes levied on the peasants, merchants etc.
In (marxist) short: holding public offices in the absolutist government is a means for the nobility to exploit the direct producers through the taxes levied on these.
Taxes then have different functions in a society where exploitation is by extra-economic means, as distinct from capitalist (our) societies where exploitatation is by purely economic means. Roughly speaking.
-Mads
David Weber said,
October 27, 2009 at 7:40 pm
Progress (or “change we believe in”) isn’t impossible with politics — on the contrary, the last two centuries have seen many advancements most, on average, would agree with. Of course, changing the fundamental flaws of human beings is impossible, which is why it’s best to be suspicious of any extreme dogma in politics.
Paul Sagar said,
October 28, 2009 at 2:03 pm
Grace,
What’s the purpose of politics? Hmm…perpetuation of (legitimised) violence? The wresting of power from others? The protection of the rights of the individual? The creation of an association pursued to escape the inconveniences and brutalities of instability? The actualisation of unique human potential? The management of the affairs of the productively-determined ruling classes?
I’m too young to answer your question. Ask me again in 30 years. But I probably won’t know then, either.
Mads,
1. I am not a Straussian. You will see why in about an hour’s time.
2. It’s not a Marxist analysis. Progress – in both senses of the word; descriptive and normative – is at the heart of Marxist conceptions of politics and political history, i’d say. I’m pointing to something different. I guess Foucault and Nietzsche have influenced my thinking on these questions rather a lot lately.
3. However, I’m responsive to the idea of revealed/expressec class interest. It’s just, I think that a) there is more than just class interest going on in these debates and b) I don’t think marxists have a monopoly on recognising class interest as a relevant factor.
4. On Rousseau, you are right about his objections to tax, vis-a-vis the status of the French nobility. Your marxist take on the differences between then and now is interesting; I’m not sure I agree with it all the way down, but there looks like there’s something to it.
David,
Before warning of the extreme dogma of others, you might want to have a think about what on earth you mean be “fundamental flaws of human beings” and whether this owes more to, erm, dogma, than anything else. Ditto your equation of “progress” with “advancement”. Bear in mind that “progress” has two meanings in English. And what might we be “advancing” towards, exactly?
David said,
October 28, 2009 at 7:14 pm
“Before warning of the extreme dogma of others, you might want to have a think about what on earth you mean be “fundamental flaws of human beings” and whether this owes more to, erm, dogma, than anything else.”
Fair enough! I try to keep an open mind — my comments about fundamental flaws of human beings is our tendency to always put our close situation in front of other considerations, to prioritise disproportionately. I don’t just mean that from a Utilitarian perspective (though that would obviously hold), but even from a minimal perspective of social responsibility — I haven’t seen anything to convince me that society can exist without some form of government, that individuals have enough of a sense of personal responsibility to ensure a stable society.
“Ditto your equation of “progress” with “advancement”.”
The latter, probably — bear in mind that I used quotation marks for a reason, I meant it in the sense it is widely used today, rather than any defined meaning.
Mads said,
October 30, 2009 at 2:08 am
Hi again Paul,
I don’t think we’re that much at odds.
The whole issue about being marxist or applying a marxist concepts to the analysis of intellectual history and political thought is a very difficult issue, not least because there is so much disagreement about what it really is to be marxist, what a marxist (historical) method really is. And yes marxist don’t have a monopoly on class analysis. I was going to say that Marx has a quite clearcut definition of class as opposed to others that might apply the class concept (or stratificaiton) in their analysis, but on second thought I’m not so sure about that. What I do think a marxist approach contributes to the discussion about class is that class is about relations to the means of production (as opposed to e.g. Max Weber where class is all about relative chances in the market). In this vein I have to insist that Marx’ analysis of the So-called primitive accumulation is particularly relevant when we’re dealing with the origins of capitalism and these particular thinkers; for thinking about what these thinkers are taking for granted and (maybe consciously) neglecting to mention.
Yes, there are a lot of other things going on here apart from class, but this being about the origins of capitalism it is bound to be central even though it might not be explicit. And a marx-informed analysis doesn’t necessarily bar you from recognising all these other things going on (unless you’re stupidly orthodox communist). For example I don’t see a marxist as being necessarily all that at odds with a skinnerian analysis as much as supplementing it. Not least because people always understand themselves and their historical situation in and through the historically specific concepts and form of thought available to them in the specific historical situation. On the other hand the “material” socio-economic conditions will influence the ways these specific forms of thought will be understood and used. This, I believe, is what much of E.P. Thompsons historical work is all about.
Political actors will have to legitimise themselves and their agenda by using this specific vocabulary, trying to transform the meaning and uses of specific concepts (e.g. the concept of luxury – how is this to be evaluated and understood, what is its relation to sloth and/or industry). This, as far as I remember, is dealt with methodologically very well in Skinners essay “Moral principles and social change” – a method not necessarily incompatible with a certain form of marxist analysis (although the emphasis will be slightly different).
Also, this particular and very sober form of marxist historical approach and analysis (in the tradition of E.P. Thompson and others), has done away with many of the (untenable) assumptions of (deterministic) historical development and (normative) progression. It has gone from a conception of linear historical progression (which Marx got from among others the scottish enlightenment and french historians) to seing historical development as more multifaceted and openended, recognising the many different historical paths that wasn’t taken.
In spite of this lengthy (sorry about that) qualification of and reservation towards the marxist approach:
We’re having pretty similar fights and arguments because of, in essential respects, similar class relations (“the underlying positions informing responses”), which makes these arguments and vocabularies relevant still?
Groundhog Days (Inside The Iron Cage) « Bad Conscience said,
November 25, 2009 at 11:23 am
[...] Intellectual History, Political Philosophy, Politics at 11:22 am by Paul Sagar I’ve recently observed that debates on political economy from the 18th Century appear not-at-all dissimilar to those of [...]