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	<title>Comments on: Denial Industry</title>
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	<link>http://badconscience.com/2009/12/09/denial-industry/</link>
	<description>&#34;But as things are, the war of the sword and the war of the pens is perpetual&#34; - Thomas Hobbes, De Cive</description>
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		<title>By: Simon Cowell and the Difficulties of Democracy &#171; Bad Conscience</title>
		<link>http://badconscience.com/2009/12/09/denial-industry/#comment-1678</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Simon Cowell and the Difficulties of Democracy &#171; Bad Conscience]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 15 Dec 2009 00:49:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://badconscience.com/?p=1423#comment-1678</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] authority over supporters. Darker voices succeeded him: Carl Schmitt (who we met last week), saw representative parliamentary democracy as in free-fall; dragged-down by the failures of [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] authority over supporters. Darker voices succeeded him: Carl Schmitt (who we met last week), saw representative parliamentary democracy as in free-fall; dragged-down by the failures of [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Paul Sagar</title>
		<link>http://badconscience.com/2009/12/09/denial-industry/#comment-1665</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Paul Sagar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 10 Dec 2009 02:49:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://badconscience.com/?p=1423#comment-1665</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&quot;I think it’s worth noting that Schmitt’s claim is different from the ’shaping of popular opinion’ claim – unless we’re talking about decisions to shape popular opinion, which doesn’t seem to be his point. Schmitt’s claim seems to be something like, what really matters is the investment strategy of oligopolists X, Y, and Z, not your government’s fiscal policy.&quot;

Yes

&quot;This, I think, for developed Western states, is pretty tendentious; governments could have regulated high finance if they’d chosen to, and it would have made a difference, for example.&quot;

Ah, but could they? Easy to say in hindsight. And I don&#039;t see any regulation on the horizon, just a windfall tax. But anyway, Schmitt&#039;s point is surely that, regulated by government rules or otherwise, business decisions are likely to have a far bigger impact on many people&#039;s lives than decisions made by politicians in a parliamentary legislature. (But note also that the &quot;small committees&quot; Schmitt talks about could quite easily cover business people &lt;em&gt;and members of the executive discussing behind closed doors&lt;/em&gt;. We know this goes on in democracies...) 

&quot;The claim about popular opinion shaping, if anything, seems to cut against that claim, because why would you shape popular opinion, if you can do what the hell you want anyway?&quot;

To cover all your bases, for a start. To maximise your advantage, for another. But mostly because, and to make the obvious Weberian point, no actor - state, individual or corporate - can ever &quot;do what the hell they want to anyway&quot;; the existing frameworks of legitimacy* serve to delineate what can and cannot be gotten away with. Hoever, if you find you want to do X but X is currently considered illegitimate, then you&#039;ll be wanting to change the conceptions of X-legitimacy. How&#039;d you do that? Well, changing popular opinion looks like a good bet...

-

*being slightly sloppy in terminology - but you follow the basic Weberian point, I&#039;m sure.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;I think it’s worth noting that Schmitt’s claim is different from the ’shaping of popular opinion’ claim – unless we’re talking about decisions to shape popular opinion, which doesn’t seem to be his point. Schmitt’s claim seems to be something like, what really matters is the investment strategy of oligopolists X, Y, and Z, not your government’s fiscal policy.&#8221;</p>
<p>Yes</p>
<p>&#8220;This, I think, for developed Western states, is pretty tendentious; governments could have regulated high finance if they’d chosen to, and it would have made a difference, for example.&#8221;</p>
<p>Ah, but could they? Easy to say in hindsight. And I don&#8217;t see any regulation on the horizon, just a windfall tax. But anyway, Schmitt&#8217;s point is surely that, regulated by government rules or otherwise, business decisions are likely to have a far bigger impact on many people&#8217;s lives than decisions made by politicians in a parliamentary legislature. (But note also that the &#8220;small committees&#8221; Schmitt talks about could quite easily cover business people <em>and members of the executive discussing behind closed doors</em>. We know this goes on in democracies&#8230;) </p>
<p>&#8220;The claim about popular opinion shaping, if anything, seems to cut against that claim, because why would you shape popular opinion, if you can do what the hell you want anyway?&#8221;</p>
<p>To cover all your bases, for a start. To maximise your advantage, for another. But mostly because, and to make the obvious Weberian point, no actor &#8211; state, individual or corporate &#8211; can ever &#8220;do what the hell they want to anyway&#8221;; the existing frameworks of legitimacy* serve to delineate what can and cannot be gotten away with. Hoever, if you find you want to do X but X is currently considered illegitimate, then you&#8217;ll be wanting to change the conceptions of X-legitimacy. How&#8217;d you do that? Well, changing popular opinion looks like a good bet&#8230;</p>
<p>-</p>
<p>*being slightly sloppy in terminology &#8211; but you follow the basic Weberian point, I&#8217;m sure.</p>
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		<title>By: Rob</title>
		<link>http://badconscience.com/2009/12/09/denial-industry/#comment-1664</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rob]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 09 Dec 2009 23:56:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://badconscience.com/?p=1423#comment-1664</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I think it&#039;s worth noting that Schmitt&#039;s claim is different from the &#039;shaping of popular opinion&#039; claim - unless we&#039;re talking about decisions to shape popular opinion, which doesn&#039;t seem to be his point. Schmitt&#039;s claim seems to be something like, what really matters is the investment strategy of oligopolists X, Y, and Z, not your government&#039;s fiscal policy. This, I think, for developed Western states, is pretty tendentious; governments could have regulated high finance if they&#039;d chosen to, and it would have made a difference, for example. The claim about popular opinion shaping, if anything, seems to cut against that claim, because why would you shape popular opinion, if you can do what the hell you want anyway?]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I think it&#8217;s worth noting that Schmitt&#8217;s claim is different from the &#8216;shaping of popular opinion&#8217; claim &#8211; unless we&#8217;re talking about decisions to shape popular opinion, which doesn&#8217;t seem to be his point. Schmitt&#8217;s claim seems to be something like, what really matters is the investment strategy of oligopolists X, Y, and Z, not your government&#8217;s fiscal policy. This, I think, for developed Western states, is pretty tendentious; governments could have regulated high finance if they&#8217;d chosen to, and it would have made a difference, for example. The claim about popular opinion shaping, if anything, seems to cut against that claim, because why would you shape popular opinion, if you can do what the hell you want anyway?</p>
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		<title>By: Paul Sagar</title>
		<link>http://badconscience.com/2009/12/09/denial-industry/#comment-1661</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Paul Sagar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 09 Dec 2009 10:50:29 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://badconscience.com/?p=1423#comment-1661</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Note also that schmitt&#039;s point appears to be one not so much about big corporations &#039;threatening&#039; democratic institutions, as making them irrelevant because it&#039;s the economic impact of corporate decisions that really matters to peoples lives in parliamentary democracy.

I chose to frame this as &#039;where the power lies&#039;, but perhaps &#039;where the significance lies&#039; would be more accurate (though the latter will have ramifications for the question of power).

However, if industry campaigns can actually shape popular opinion - and perhaps the climate example shows they can - then this does suggest that democratic institutions are in some sense threatened. We don&#039;t need a naively simplistic model of corporations dictating to governments to hold that contention.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Note also that schmitt&#8217;s point appears to be one not so much about big corporations &#8216;threatening&#8217; democratic institutions, as making them irrelevant because it&#8217;s the economic impact of corporate decisions that really matters to peoples lives in parliamentary democracy.</p>
<p>I chose to frame this as &#8216;where the power lies&#8217;, but perhaps &#8216;where the significance lies&#8217; would be more accurate (though the latter will have ramifications for the question of power).</p>
<p>However, if industry campaigns can actually shape popular opinion &#8211; and perhaps the climate example shows they can &#8211; then this does suggest that democratic institutions are in some sense threatened. We don&#8217;t need a naively simplistic model of corporations dictating to governments to hold that contention.</p>
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		<title>By: Paul Sagar</title>
		<link>http://badconscience.com/2009/12/09/denial-industry/#comment-1659</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Paul Sagar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 09 Dec 2009 10:38:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://badconscience.com/?p=1423#comment-1659</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Cheers, I will have a read. On the other side, remind me to email you a paper by Susan Strange arguing that MNCs need to be considered as significant actors in international relations theory due to the fact govts have to negotiate with them re attracting investment, making economic decisions etc.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Cheers, I will have a read. On the other side, remind me to email you a paper by Susan Strange arguing that MNCs need to be considered as significant actors in international relations theory due to the fact govts have to negotiate with them re attracting investment, making economic decisions etc.</p>
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		<title>By: Grace</title>
		<link>http://badconscience.com/2009/12/09/denial-industry/#comment-1658</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Grace]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 09 Dec 2009 10:09:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://badconscience.com/?p=1423#comment-1658</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[You might be interested in this article:

http://economia.unipv.it/pagp/pagine_personali/amajocchi/How%20big%20are%20the%20big%20multinational%20companies.pdf

&quot;Multinational corporations are increasingly seen as excessively big and powerful, and as having dramatically increased in size and power. This perception has led to the view that the big corporations are threatening democratic institutions of the nation-states and that they pervert the cultural and social fabric of countries. 

In this paper we analyse the size of large corporations and the recent trends in this size. Using value-added data (instead of sales) we find that multinationals are surprisingly small compared to the GDP of many nation-states. In addition, if anything, the size of multinationals relative to the size of nations has tended to decline somewhat during the last 20 years. Finally, we argue that there is little evidence that the economic and political power of multinationals has increased in the last few decades.&quot;]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You might be interested in this article:</p>
<p><a href="http://economia.unipv.it/pagp/pagine_personali/amajocchi/How%20big%20are%20the%20big%20multinational%20companies.pdf" rel="nofollow">http://economia.unipv.it/pagp/pagine_personali/amajocchi/How%20big%20are%20the%20big%20multinational%20companies.pdf</a></p>
<p>&#8220;Multinational corporations are increasingly seen as excessively big and powerful, and as having dramatically increased in size and power. This perception has led to the view that the big corporations are threatening democratic institutions of the nation-states and that they pervert the cultural and social fabric of countries. </p>
<p>In this paper we analyse the size of large corporations and the recent trends in this size. Using value-added data (instead of sales) we find that multinationals are surprisingly small compared to the GDP of many nation-states. In addition, if anything, the size of multinationals relative to the size of nations has tended to decline somewhat during the last 20 years. Finally, we argue that there is little evidence that the economic and political power of multinationals has increased in the last few decades.&#8221;</p>
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